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Why punish hate?
by Frederick M Lawrence
In this excerpt from Chapter 7 of his recent book Punishing Hate: Bias Crimes Under 
American Law (Harvard University Press, 1999), Professor Lawrence of Boston 
University considers the often controversial debate over the treatment in law of 
crimes motivated by racial hatred and the wider issue of punishment theory.
T he last several decades have seen a dramatic increase in the awareness of bias crimes   both by the public generally and the legal culture in particular   and the 
need for a legal response. We need look no further than the 
marked rise in the number of bias crime laws.
These developments, however, can obscure the controversy 
that often surrounds the debate over the enactment of a bias 
crime law. For example, during the debate over Arizona's bias 
crime law, enacted in 1997, one legislator objected on the 
grounds that 'I still don't believe that a crime against one person 
is any more heinous than the same crime against someone else.' 
Another put the matter more bluntly: 'a few Jews' in the 
legislature were making the issue 'emotional and divisive.' 1 
Acrimony has surrounded the debate over many state laws. Is it 
really worth it?
This question is not entirely rhetorical. Obviously, the entire 
thrust of the preceding chapters argues that bias crimes laws are 
justifiable and constitutional. But to a large extent, I have 
assumed the need to punish hate as my starting point. The 
implicit premise ot the task has been to provide justifications for 
the punishment of racially-motivated violence in criminal law 
doctrine, and to square this punishment with free expression 
doctrine.
Before concluding, it is wise to step back from this 
assumption, to ask not merely whether it is justified to punish 
hate, but is it necessary to punish hate. A state may do so   but 
should it? The question is clearer if not conceived as a choice 
between punishing bias crimes and not doing so. Were the choice 
truly this stark, the answer would be obvious and compelling. 
One of the arguments advanced for including sexual orientation 
in bias crime statutes, for example, is that assaults against gays 
and lesbians are notoriously under-investigated by the police and 
under-prosecuted by local district attorneys." (A similar 
argument is often made concerning laws aimed at domestic 
violence.) The obvious and compelling response to this situation 
is that 'gay bashing', like domestic violence, should be properly 
treated by the criminal justice system. The argument based on 
under-enforcement, however, does not support the conclusion 
that sexual orientation should be a bias crime, because it is based 
on a false choice or, better put, an incomplete choice. The choice 
between punishing gay bashing as a bias crime or not at all, omits1 o o J o '
the option of properly handling these crimes as parallel assaults, 
without regard to the bias motivation. If these cases were
investigated as carefully and prosecuted as vigorously as any other 
assault, then our concerns would be satisfied without the need to 
include sexual orientation in a bias crime law. One could argue 
that the inclusion ot sexual orientation in bias crime laws is the 
best way, or perhaps the only way, to improve the manner in 
which the criminal justice system responds to these crimes. If 
true, it represents a strong, fairly obvious, justification. But, to be 
tested properly, the 'Is it really worth it?' question must assume 
that the criminal justice system otherwise works or could be 
made to work. Is it really worth the acrimony that often 
accompanies the debates over bias crime laws, to prosecute these 
crimes as bias crimes?
There is one other tempting answer to 'Is it really worth it?' 
that ultimately fails. This answer argues that mere investigation 
and prosecution of bias crimes are not the only goals. For the 
reasons discussed in Chapter 3, bias crimes require not only 
punishment, but greater punishment than parallel crimes. One 
could argue that bias crime laws are worth it in order to obtain 
enhanced punishment of racially-motivated violence. There is, 
however, a softer means of achieving that end, one that would 
avoid the need to enact bias crime laws per se. Consider, for 
example, the manner in which the law treats racially-motivated 
violence in Great Britain. Other than the crime of incitement to 
racial hatred, a crime limited largely to distribution of racist 
pamphlets, and very difficult to prosecute, there is no specific 
crime for racially-motivated violence in the UK [but please see 
author's endnote concerning the provisions of the Crime and 
Disorder Act 1998, enacted after his manuscript went to press]. 111 
In the case of a racially-motivated assault, however, British law 
enforcement officials may take the perpetrator's motivation into 
account in deciding whether to pursue the case, and the Court 
may similarly take motivation into account in determining the 
proper sentence. Enhanced punishment of bias crimes therefore 
exists, at least in theory, without the need for an expressed bias 
crime law. This brings us back to the question: 'Is it worth it?'
The answer is that it is well worthwhile to have laws that 
expressly punish racially-motivated violence. In order to see 
why, we must return to the general justifications for 
punishment, and now augment that discussion with a 
consideration of the expressive value of punishment or what is 
sometimes known as the denunciation theory of punishment. 
The expressive value of punishment allows us to say not only 
that bias crime laws are warranted, they are essential.
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THE EXPRESSIVE VALUE OF PUNISHMENT
Criminal punishment carries with it social disapproval, 
resentment and indignation. Compare the social stigma involved 
in a conviction for criminal tax evasion with that triggered bv aoo .
civil finding of under-payment of taxes. Criminal punishment 
inherently stigmatises. One of the strongest modern statements 
of this view of punishment is found in the report of the Royal 
Commission on Capital Punishment:
'Punishment is the way in which society expresses its denunciation of 
wrong doing: and in order to maintain respect for law, it is essential 
that punishment inflicted for grave crimes should adequately rejlect the 
revulsion felt by the great majority of citizens jbr them ... [T]he 
ultimate justification for any punishment is, not that it is a deterrent, 
but that it is the emphatic denunciation by the community oj a crime.' lv
Regardless of one's view of capital punishment, this 
description of punishment is compelling. Henry Hart saw the 
expressive value of punishment as the key to the distinction 
between the criminal and the civil:
'What distinguishes a criminal from a civil sanction, and all that 
distinguishes it ... is the judgment of community condemnation which 
accompanies and justifies its imposition. ' x
This insight allows us to expand the understanding of 
punishment theory developed in Chapter 3 where we 
considered both retributive and utilitarian, or consequentialist, 
theories of punishment. Expressive punishment theory is 
neither wholly separate from, nor wholly contained by, 
retributive and consequentialist approaches to punishment.
Emile Durkheim was one of the first to focus upon the role of 
social denunciation in punishment. Durkheim argued that 
punishment represents societal condemnation of certain 
behaviour and that social cohesion emerges from the act of 
punishment/1 In his classic The Division of Labour in Society, 
Durkheim rejected consequentialist justifications of punishment 
on practical grounds:
'[Punishment] does not serve, or semes only very incidentally, to 
correct the guilty person or to scare off any possible imitators. For this 
dual viewpoint its effectiveness may rightly be questioned; in any case it 
is mediocre.' U1
The real function of punishment, according to Durkheim:
'is to maintain inviolate the cohesion of society by sustaining the 
common consciousness in all its vigour.' vm
The criminal law represents the expression of the 'common 
consciousness' of the community. When this shared expression 
of values is \iolated, that is, when a crime is committed, the 
society faces a choice between not responding and responding 
through criminal punishment. If there is no response, 'there 
would result a relaxation in the bonds of social solidarity.' The 
only appropriate response, punishment of the wrongdoer:
'is a sign indicating that the sentiments of the collectivity are still 
unchanged, and the communion of minds sharing these same beliefs 
remains absolute.'
Without punishment, the collective moral consciousness 
could not be preserved. lx
Durkheim's denunciation theory of punishment has been 
subject to two main strands of critique, one based in sociology
and the other in punishment theory. The sociological critique 
questions the linkage, by sheer assertion, between law and moral 
consensus. There is no room for social conflict in a theory that 
posits a single collective consciousness that is expressed in the 
criminal law. x If we understand the criminal law to have been 
produced through social conflict, and not through the 
expression of a universal societal norm, then, according to this 
critique, denunciation loses much of its lustre as a justification 
for criminal punishment.
The punishment-theory critique questions the requirement, 
again by sheer assertion, that denunciation of the violation of 
social norms should proceed by criminal punishment of the 
wrongdoer. The denunciatory effect could be achieved in any 
number of means   for example, public pronouncement by the 
head of state or a judge, or shooting off a cannon in the public- 
square   so long as the convention is understood by the 
audience. That punishment is the proper convention requires an 
independent justification for punishment, a justification that 
denunciation itself does not provide. Denunciation thus cannot 
stand on its own as a theory of punishment and ultimately relies 
upon some other justification for its validity'.
Nigel Walker captured this critique well: 'denouncers are 
really either quasi-retributivists or crypto-[consequentialists].'xl 
They are quasi-retributivists because the convention of 
punishment as the means to denounce makes sense only where 
the defendant deserves to be punished. Punishment without 
desert would leave the denunciation vague at best. Alternatively, 
thev are crypto-consequentialists because they justify 
punishment by the social utility that it produces. Unlike that of 
classic consequentialists, denouncers' utility comes in the form 
of social cohesion, not, strictly speaking, crime reduction. But it 
is a utility calculus nonetheless.xu Understood this way, 
Durkheim is seen not as a ground-breaker proposing a third 
approach to punishment theory, but rather as a utilitarian in the 
mould of those who advocated the educative theory of 
punishment such as Alfred Ewing and Bernard Bosanquet. x111
Both the sociological and punishment-theory critiques of the 
denunciation theory have merit. Neither calls for an 
abandonment of that theory, but each calls for its modification. 
The sociological critique is right to challenge the criminal law as 
some universal expression of the community's will. Such a 
wooden view of the law is inconsistent with all we have come to 
understand about the process by which legislation is created and 
law is made.xlv But we can relax this extreme view of the 
criminal law without doing serious violence to the fundamental 
usefulness of the expressive value of punishment. First, while it 
is certainly true that criminal laws do not receive unanimous 
support, there is a considerable social consensus underpinning 
the criminal law. Most criminal prohibitions, at least at a general 
level, derive widespread public support.^ Moreover, we would 
expect that this level of support would be even higher if we look 
to find, not those who believe that any particular criminal law or 
even principle of criminal law represents the moral view of the 
community, but those who believe that the rule of law generally
J ' O ^
represents the moral view of the community. Those who believe 
both that a sufficient weight of the criminal law does reflect the 
community's sense, and that there is a basic legitimacy to the 
system that produces criminal law, would thus also believe that 
there is a moral weight to the criminal law generally, even to
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those specific laws with which they might happen to disagree. 
Obedience to the law thus represents a moral value of a broad 
spectrum of the community.
Even so, there will never be unanimity as to the moral sense 
of the community and indeed there may be dispute as to 
whether there is a single 'community' that may have a single 
view. This too may be accommodated by the expressive view of 
punishment when we exchange the descriptive claim of universal 
consensus for a normative claim of what the community's values 
ought to be. Obviously, there will be dispute over the moral value 
of the criminal law. My argument, however, is two-fold. First, the 
areas of dispute are not as widespread as mav first be imagined 
  all reasonable people will agree that, all things being equal, it 
is worse to kill than to injure, and that it is worse to cause 
unjustified harm purposefully than accidentally. Second, as to 
those areas of dispute, the stakes of the argument are not merely 
who ought to go to jail, but what the moral view of the 
community about such conduct should be.
The punishment-theory critique of Durkheim may also be 
accommodated in a means that yields a richer expressive theory 
of punishment. The punishment-theory critique properly 
contends that expressive theory is not a free-standing 
independent justification for punishment. As we saw in Chapter 
3, however, much of the work in contemporary philosophy of 
punishment has concerned 'mixed theories' of punishment, 
drawing on aspects of both utilitarian and retributivist thought. 
So long as expressive theory is not merely redundant with 
retributive or consequential arguments, it legitimately takes its 
place among these eclectic approaches. The expressive values of 
punishment take us beyond classic statements of other 
punishment theories. To be coherent, expressive punishment 
does require individual culpability and retributive desert. 
Whereas deontological notions of desert focus only on the 
wrongdoer and either the debt that he owes to society or the 
punishment that society owes him, expressive theory looks to 
the societal aspects of this punishment. Expressive theory may 
actually help elucidate some of the murkier aspects of retributive 
theory.
Consider Kant's famous teaching that, on the last dav before 
an island community disbands 'to separate and scatter ... 
throughout the world,' it should execute its last imprisoned 
murderers." 1 Typically, this is taken as the paradigmatic 
expression of Kantian retributivism   this extreme punishment 
is necessary even after all consequences have become irrelevant. 
Kant justifies the punishment:
'in order that everyone may realise the desert of [the murderers'] 
deeds.' xvii
Joel Feinberg has found expressive aspects in the continuation 
of Kant's formulation. If the island community members did not 
execute their murderers, Kant wrote:
'they miaht all be regarded as participators in the murder as a public 
violation oj Justice.'
Feinberg argues that this punishment, as a means of 
demonstrating public non-acquiescence with the crime, is more 
symbolic and expressive than it is retributive." 111
Expressive theory also has a consequentialist aspect. However, 
we can distinguish those consequences that seek to reduce
crime, whether by incapacitation, deterrence, or rehabilitation, 
from those consequences that announce values. The ultimate 
audience for punishment that seeks to reduce crime is composed 
of criminals and would-be criminals. The ultimate audience for 
punishment that seeks to announce values is composed of law- 
abiding citizens. X1X The utilitarian dimension of denunciation, 
therefore, looks to a greatly expanded set of considerations over 
those traditionally considered by consequentialist approaches to 
punishment.
Expressive punishment theory, although derivative of 
retributive and consequentialist theories of punishment, builds 
on these theories and expands our understanding of 
punishment. In the final analysis, the punishment-theory 
critique may simply miss the mark   it criticises denunciation 
theory for failing to answer adequately a question that 
denunciation theory does not conceive to be central to its 
mission. Expressive theory may be concerned less with 
providing a full justification of punishment than with 
understanding the full impact of punishment. Indeed, Durkheim 
may well not have seen his project as one of justifying 
punishment, which he took to be a sociological fact of all 
cultures, but rather as one of investigating the role of 
punishment in advanced societies. xx Recognizing the expressive 
value of punishment, by itself, may provide limited help in 
answering the initial normative question as to whether society 
may punish its members. Once we answer that question 
affirmatively, however, societal denunciation must inform our 
decisions about the nature of that punishment.
THE EXPRESSIVE VALUE OF PUNISHING 
BIAS CRIMES
We may now return to the question we raised at the outset of 
this chapter: is it really worth it? Is it really worth the acrimony 
that often accompanies the debates over bias crime laws, to 
prosecute these crimes as bias crimes?
What happens when proposed bias crime legislation becomes 
law? This act of law-making constitutes a societal condemnation 
of racism, religious intolerance, and other forms of bigotry that 
are covered by that law. Moreover, every act of condemnation is 
dialectically twinning with an act of expression of values   in 
Durkheim's terms social cohesion. Punishment not only signals 
the border between that which is permitted and that which is 
proscribed, but also denounces that which is rejected and 
announces that which is embraced. Because racial harmonv and 
equality are among the highest values held in our society, crimes 
that violate these values should be punished and must be 
punished specifically as bias crimes. Similarly, bias crimes must 
be punished more harshly than crimes that, although otherwise 
similar, do not violate these values. Moreover, racial harmony 
and equality' are not values that exist only, or even primarily, in 
an abstract sense. The particular biases that are implicated by 
bias crimes are connected with a real, extended history of grave 
injustices to the victim groups, resulting in enormous suffering 
and loss. In many ways these injustices, and their legacies, 
persist.
What happens if bias crimes are not expressly punished in a 
criminal justice system, or, if expressly punished, not punished 
more harshly than parallel crimes? Here, too, there is a message 
expressed by the legislation, a message that racial harmony and
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equality are not among the highest values held by the community. 
Put differently, it is impossible for the punishment choices made 
by the society not to express societal values. There is no neutral 
position, no middle ground. The only question is the content of 
that expression and the resulting statement of those values.
Two cases, one of which involves the debate over a bias crime 
law, illustrate the point. Consider first the case of the creation of 
a legal holiday to commemorate the birth of Dr Martin Luther 
King, Jr. Once the idea of such a holiday gained widespread 
attention, the federal government and most states created 
Martin Luther King Day within a relatively short period of 
time.**' It was impossible, however, for a state to take 'no 
position' on the holiday. Several states, including South Carolina, 
Arizona, New Hampshire, North Carolina and Texas, did not 
immediately adopt the holiday. These states were perceived 
generally as rejecting the holiday. More significantly, they were 
perceived as rejecting the values associated with Dr King, which 
were being commemorated by the holiday marking his birthday. 
Civil rights groups brought pressure against these states with 
economic boycotts, and the like. 1""' Once ignited, the debate over 
Martin Luther King Day became one as to which there was no 
neutral position. The lack of legislation was a rejection of the 
holiday and the values with which it was associated.
The second case concerns the debate in 1997 over a bias 
crime law in Georgia, the site of one of the most acrimonious of 
the legislative battles over such legislation. The tensiono o
surrounding the debate was heightened by the recent bombing 
of a lesbian nightclub in Atlanta. Ultimately, the legislation failed 
to make it to the tloor of the Georgia legislature for a vote. As 
with Martin Luther King Day, there was no middle position for 
Georgia to adopt. Either a bias crime law would be established, 
with the attending expression of certain values, or it would not, 
with a rejection of these values and an expression of other, 
antithetical value*. The values expressed by the rejection of the 
law are aptly caught by the unusually blunt views of one Georgia 
legislator: 'What's the big deal about a few swastikas on a 
synagogue?' Others derided the legislation as the 'Queer Bill'. 30"11
Thus far we have considered the enactment of a bias crime law 
to be a simple binary choice: a legislature enacts a bias crime law 
or it does not. To do so denounces racial hatred, and to fail to do 
so gives comfort to the racist. We can make a similar observation 
in the more subtle context of establishing grades of crimes and 
levels of criminal punishment. In Chapter 3, we discussed the 
ways in which both retributive and consequentialist theories of 
punishment embraced a concept of proportionality. Now we can 
see that expressive punishment theory does as well. Conduct 
that is more offensive to society should receive relatively greater 
punishment than that which is less offensive. We would be 
shocked if a legislature punished shoplifting equally with 
aggravated assault. We might disagree as to whether one was 
punished excessively or the other insufficiently, but we would 
agree that these crimes ought not to be treated identically. 
Society's most cherished values will be reflected in the criminal 
law by applying the harshest penalties to those crimes that violate 
these values. There will certainly be lesser penalties for those 
crimes that in some respects are similar but do not violate these 
values. The hierarchy of societal values involved in criminal 
conduct will thus be reflected by the lesser crime's status as a 
lesser included offence within the more serious crime.
The enshrinement of racial harmony and equality among our 
highest values not only calls for independent punishment of 
racially-motivated violence as a bias crime and not merely as a 
parallel crime; it also calls for enhanced punishment of bias 
crimes over parallel crimes. If bias crimes are not punished more 
harshly than parallel crimes, the implicit message expressed by 
the criminal justice system is that racial harmony and equality 
are not among the highest values in our society. If a racially- 
motivated assault is punished identically to a parallel assault, the 
racial motivation of the bias crime is rendered largely irrelevant 
and thus not part of that which is condemned. The individual 
victim, the target community, and indeed the society at large thus 
suffers the twin insults akin to those suffered by the narrator of 
Ralph Ellison's Invisible Man.**" Not only has the crime itself 
occurred, but the underlying hatred of the crime is invisible~to 
the eyes of the legal system. The punishment of bias crimes as 
argued for in this book, therefore, is necessary for the full 
expression of commitment to American values of equality of 
treatment and opportunity.
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